Should we attack Iran?

Should we Attack Iran?

A response to “Time to Attack Iran,” by Matthew Kroenig, found in the 90^th Anniversary Issue of Foreign Affairs (January/February 2012 issue)

Matthew Kroenig, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations (As well as an author on a number of books) writes in his article, [i]Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option”[/i]  that the idea of a nuclear Iran is intolerable and that current US policies towards Iran are not working. He argues that the there should be a radical change in policy: from determent and stopping the program that way, the United States should go into Iran to forcibly end their nuclear programs. He also argues that striking Iran would be effective if the United States wanted to preempt Israel going into Iran. Throughout the essay he brings up various counterarguments, and responds to them rather effectively. The essay also fails to address one key point, and this may bring down the whole article.

To begin with Kroenig explores why the United States must change their policy. “Some states in the [Middle East] region,” he writes, “are doubting U.S. resolve to stop the program and are shifting their allegiances to Tehran. Others have begun to discuss launching their own nuclear initiatives to counter a possibly Iranian bomb.” (77-78) An unchecked Iranian nuclear program therefore creates uncertainty in the region, both among Iran’s allies and its enemies. Further, he argues that a nuclear Iran would “immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the Middle East.” (78) To not end the Iranian program now could not only undermine the stability of the region for those regions not in the throes of the Arab Spring, but might also impede our involvement in the Middle East. The countries that spring to mind in this regard are Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, if Iran were to achieve and complete the development of an atom bomb, then this would bolster Iran by giving it “greater cover for conventional aggression and coercive diplomacy, and the battles between its terrorist proxies and Israel, for example, could escalate.” (78) This in turn, might cause the balance in the region between Israel and Iran to further “spiral out of control” in time of crisis (78).

Kroenig’s next step is to explain what the United States would have to do to contain the case of a nuclear Iran. The devices by which the US could use to control a nuclear Iran would come at an enormous cost, not feasible in the current economic conditions. “To contain a nuclear Iran,” He writes, “the US would need to make a substantial investment of political and military capital to the Middle East in the Midst of an economic crisis and at a time when it is attempting to shit its forces out of the region.” If the US is seeking to REMOVE itself from the region, a nuclear Iran would KEEP them from leaving the Middle East. He also addresses the issue of deterrence. Deterrence from development of a nuclear Iran would be even worse as it would “Come with enormous economic and geopolitical costs and would have to remain in place as long as Iran remained hostile to US interests, which could mean decades or longer.” (79) Korenig believes that deterrence is far too expensive, and therefore would not be a practical option. Thus, the only option remaining is the military option.

In discussing the military option, Kroenig explores various arguments against it. For instance, he asserts that it is highly unlikely that we do not know all of the locations of Iran’s nuclear facilities (79), that the major targets needed to destroy or disable Iran’s nuclear program are actually aboveground  (80), and that civilian casualties woud be limited because those that die in the bombing would be majorly consist of “military personnel, engineers, scientists, and technicians working at the facilities.” (80) However, a military operation should not be a free-form operation.

Instead, Kroenig argues that certain “redlines,” or criteria, for the operation must be set for many reasons, the most noticeable of them being that a “U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war. Iran might retaliate against US Troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe.” (82) Other drawbacks include that Iran may close off the Strait of Hormuz, might “bid up the price of oil.” (82) He argues that these results are unlikely, but it would retaliate in some form because it would “likely seek to calibrate its actions to avoid starting a conflict that could lead to the destruction of its military or the regime itself.” (82) Kroenig’s argument is that the US should not threaten Iran in the aforementioned way. Instead, he argues that US must make clear to Iran that the only thing that a military operation would seek to accomplish would be to destroy the nuclear facilities (83). But they’d also have to accept retaliation that includes “accepting token missile strikes against US bases and ships in the region…or the harassment of commercial and US naval vessels.” (83) Even if Iran exceeded these actions,  to de-escalate the situation, the US would need to “secure the agreement of its allies to avoid responding to an Iranian attack.” (83) Israel would be willing to do this on the condition that the US eliminates the nuclear program of Iran.

There are still other arguments Kroenig addresses, namely that if Iran is going to develop a nuclear program, then a US attack won’t further encourage them because they already know what they are going to do and don’t need any further incentive, that an attack on Iran wouldn’t forestall the inevitable because their capability would be too severely impacted, and that any claims of further strengthening “hard-liners” in the Iranian government are spurious because they are already in charge (84-85).

The weakest point of the above mentioned is the issue that an attack on Iran only buys time. His argument that Iraq and Syria were “unwilling [to] or unable to restart their nuclear [programs]” (85) is undermined because it does not take into consideration that a) Syria’s weapons of mass destruction program was in its infant stages in 2007, and that shortly thereafter the Arab Spring began (Iran has had no such major movement in its country, and further, when there was one, the protests were nearly immediately shut down and life returned to the normal oppressive state). This would have probably caused more harm than could should the nuclear program be restarted now and give the rest of the world community the excuse it needs to invade Syria and stop its oppression of its people, and that b) Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program was stopped by an Israeli strike in 1989 and that shortly thereafter it was “officially” stopped in 1990. In both instances, Syria and Iraq had a major conflict going on within its country and within the world. Iran, despite its oppressive government, has yet to have such an incident. This fact is left unaddressed and omitted when he describes this argument. In Iran, where there are no major complications going on within its country, it becomes easy to see that its program could be restarted. This casts doubt on a lot of his argument because it causes the reader to wonder if all of the above arguments, he is using Syria and Iraq as feasible examples, but, again, he's comparing them to Iran, which has never been in any of these situations before. 

Finally, Kroenig mentions one other important point about a strike on Iran, which is that, if the US intervenes first, Israel would have no need to attack, and would thus mitigate the consequences. This seems to be the most accurate statement; it is better for the US to be involved than Israel, especially when considering Israel's relationship in the rest of the world.

Overall, his essay is well-thought out and brings up valid issues. However, some key points, like the one mentioned above, seem to be omitting very key facts and seems to be comparing countries and incidents to circumstances that DO NOT exist in Iran currently. To this degree, one should be wary when siding fully with the author of this paper, and question most of his argument.